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This paper considers a two-type, self-selection, overlapping generations model with 
nonlinear labor income and capital income taxation and public good provision, when 
people care about their relative consumption compared to others. In each case, the 
standard optimality expressions are modified by terms that reflect the extent to which 
people care about relative consumption. The modified tax formulas imply 
substantially higher marginal labor income tax rates than in the conventional case, 
under plausible assumptions and available empirical estimates regarding comparison 
consumption concerns. The extent to which the public good provision rule should be 
modified is shown to depend critically on the preference elicitation format. The 
effects of positionality on the marginal capital income tax rates are ambiguous.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on optimal taxation and public goods typically assumes that the utility 
of each individual depends only on his/her own consumption of goods, leisure and 
services. Yet, there is growing empirical evidence suggesting that this assumption 
may not be entirely appropriate. In particular, several recent empirical studies have 
focused on interdependence among individuals in the form of status effects, showing 
that individuals value their own consumption (or income) relative to that of others.
1 
There are also recent evolutionary models that explain why selfish genes would prefer 
that the humans they belong to are motivated by relative concerns (Samuelson 2004; 
Rayo and Becker 2007). The present paper considers an overlapping generations 
(OLG) model where relative consumption matters, and where the consumers differ in 
ability and preferences. The set of tax instruments facing the government consists of 
nonlinear taxes on both labor and capital income; the revenues from which are used to 
redistribute and provide a public good. The overall purpose is to analyze how the 
appearance of relative consumption concerns modifies the optimal tax structure and 
public good provision, respectively, compared with the standard model for nonlinear 
taxation. 
 
Earlier literature dealing with public policy and relative consumption or income 
addresses a variety of issues such as income tax policy (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, 
Blomquist 1993, Persson 1995, Ireland 2001), public good provision (Ng 1987), 
social insurance (Abel 2005), growth (Corneo and Jeanne 1997, 2001), environmental 
externalities (Brekke and Howarth 2002; Wendner 2005; Howarth 2006) and 
stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000). However, most studies that analyze 
taxes are based on linear tax instruments in static models, and have in common that 
they neglect capital income taxation. To our knowledge, the only papers that deal with 
relative income under nonlinear taxation are Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990) and 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Easterlin (1995, 2001), Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005), van 
Praag and Frijters (1999),  Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Stutzer (2004), Alpizar et al. (2005), 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007).   3
Ireland (2001). Each of these innovative studies use static models without the 
possibilities to tax capital income and provide public goods.
2   
 
Why is it interesting to extend the study of public policy under relative consumption 
concerns into a dynamic model where the government uses redistributive nonlinear 
taxation? First, nonlinear income taxes constitute a reasonably realistic description of 
the tax instruments that many countries have (or potentially have) at their disposal. In 
our case, therefore, the government’s decision to use distortionary income taxation 
will follow from optimization, given the available information, and not from any a 
priori restrictions on the set of available policy instruments. This means that our 
model provides a suitable framework for analyzing the basic question of whether the 
appearance of relative consumption concerns itself motivates the use of distortionary 
taxation. In addition, as we are able to show that such a motive indeed exists, our 
model also enables us to study how and why this corrective motive for taxation 
interacts with the redistributive (i.e. self-selection) motive for using distortionary 
taxation.
3 Second, by using a dynamic model, we are able to consider capital income 
taxation. Since earlier research suggests that the capital income tax may be a useful 
tool for relaxing the self-selection constraint (see below), a natural question here is 
whether this tax is also useful for purposes of internalizing positional externalities. 
This research question is strengthened by the potential interaction between the 
redistributive and corrective motives for tax policy mentioned above. Third, the 
knowledge of public good provision in second best economies with relative 
consumption concerns is very scarce. As far as we know, there is only one earlier 
study dealing with this issue, namely Wendner and Goulder (2007), in a model with 
identical individuals where the public good is financed by linear taxation. As earlier 
studies have shown that policy rules for public goods are very sensitive to the tax 
                                                 
2 There are also dynamic models dealing with relative income concerns, such as Abel (2005), which do 
not explicitly consider distributional issues. 
3 Earlier literature on optimal nonlinear income taxation typically abstracts from corrective motives for 
taxation. Exceptions are the studies dealing with environmental externalities (e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala 
1997; Cremer and Ghavari 1998; and Aronsson and Blomquist 2003) and unemployment (e.g. Marceau 
and Boadway 1994; Aronsson and Sjögren 2004; and Aronsson et al. 2007). 
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instruments available to the government,
4 it appears worthwhile to analyze public 
goods in the context of our more general model. 
 
There is a small yet growing literature dealing with redistribution and/or public 
provision under asymmetric information in dynamic economies. It extends the 
traditional static optimal income tax model to allow for both labor income and capital 
income taxation. The seminal contribution here is a paper by Ordover and Phelps 
(1979). In a model with a continuum of ability-types, they show (among other things) 
that if leisure is separable from private consumption in terms of the utility function (so 
the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption does not 
depend on the leisure choice other than via income), then the marginal capital income 
tax rate should be zero for each ability-type. Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), in a 
generalization of the model in Brett (1997), consider an OLG model with two ability-
types and endogenous before tax wage rates. Their results show that production 
inefficiency at the second best optimum (which is a consequence of the desire to relax 
the self-selection constraint) justifies capital income taxation, whereas the marginal 
labor income tax rates take the same general form as in Stiglitz (1982), i.e. a positive 
marginal labor income tax rate should be imposed on the low-ability type and a 
negative marginal labor income tax rate on the high-ability type. Finally, Boadway et 
al. (2000) analyze nonlinear labor income taxation and proportional capital income 
taxation in a model where both ability and initial wealth are unobserved by the 
government. In their framework, the capital income tax is interpretable as an indirect 
instrument to tax wealth. 
 
Our study is based on a two-type model, where the preferences facing each ability-
type in each generation are described by a general (nonseparable) utility function. In 
addition, as our model contains production and does not restrict the analysis to a linear 
technology, it follows that the before tax wage rates are endogenous. The government 
redistributes and collects revenues for a public good by using general labor income 
                                                 
4 The literature dealing with public good provision under nonlinear income taxation explains, among 
other things, how the desire to relax the self-selection constraint motivates deviations from the first best 
Samuelson rule; this is further discussed below. See also e.g. Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and 
Keen (1993). 
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and capital income taxation. Therefore, our model largely resembles the one used by 
Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), with the important exception that in our case the relative 
private consumption matters for individual utility.  
 
The present paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, we are able 
to characterize the optimal labor income and capital income tax structure in an 
economy, where each individual compares his/her own private consumption with that 
of others. As argued above, this is a relevant extension of earlier literature dealing 
with redistribution under asymmetric information, as this literature typically 
disregards the consequences of relative consumption concerns. It is also relevant for 
purposes of comparison with earlier literature on public policy and relative 
consumption, in which more restrictive tax instruments are used. Second, the paper 
contributes to the literature on public good provision. By analogy to the arguments 
discussed above, this is relevant both (1) as an extension to earlier literature dealing 
with public good provision in economies with asymmetric information and general 
income taxes (which does not consider relative consumption concerns), and (2) as a 
comparison with the study of public provision in economies with positional goods and 
linear tax instruments. 
 
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the outcome 
of private optimization. Section 3 characterizes the optimal tax and expenditure 
problem of the government, whereas Section 4 presents the corresponding results in a 
format that aims to facilitate straightforward interpretations and comparisons with 
earlier literature. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Positional preferences, firms and market equilibrium 
 
Consider an OLG model where each agent lives for two periods. Following the 
convention in earlier literature, we assume that each individual works during the first 
period of life and does not work during the second period. There are two types of 
individuals, where the low-ability type (type 1) is less productive than the high-ability 
type (type 2), and where 
i
t n  denotes the number of individuals of ability-type i that 
were born at the beginning of period t. Such an individual cares about his/her   6
consumption when young and when old, 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x + ; his/her leisure when young, 
i
t z , 
given by a time endowment, H , less the hours of work, 
i
t l  (when old, all available 
time is leisure); and the provided amount of the public good when young and when 
old,  t G  and  1 t G + .  
 
In addition, people care about their relative consumption when both young and old. 
The preferences for relative consumption, or positional preferences, can of course be 
modeled in many different ways. Here, we follow the dominating bulk of the literature 
and assume that each individual compares his/her own consumption in period t with a 
reference level determined by the average consumption in the economy as a whole at 
that time,  t c . We also follow e.g. Akerlof (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007) in 
letting the relative consumption be described by the difference between the 
individual’s own consumption and the mean consumption in the economy as a whole.
5    
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where the function  ()
i
t v ⋅  is increasing in each argument, implying that  ( )
i
t u ⋅  is 
decreasing in  t c and  1 t c +  (a property that Dupor and Liu 2003 denote “jealousy”) and 
increasing in the other arguments; both  ()
i
t v ⋅  and  ( )
i
t u ⋅  are assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable in their respective arguments and strictly concave. The 
                                                 
5 Alternative approaches include ratio comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980) and 
comparisons of the ordinal rank (Frank 1985; Hopkins and Kornienko 2004). Dupor and Liu (2003) 
consider a specific flexible functional form that includes the difference comparison and ratio 
comparison approaches as special cases. It is, of course, also possible that people compare themselves 
more to some people than to others, although, as noted by Clark et al. (2006), empirical evidence is 
scarce. Still, we believe that most qualitative results hold for many generalizations along those lines. 
Nevertheless, such generalizations constitute worthwhile extensions for future research.   7
reference consumption levels in periods t and t+1, respectively, measured by the mean 
consumption level of all people alive, are given by 
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11 tttt t Nnnn n −− =++ +  and 
12 1 2
111 tttt t Nnnn n +++ = ++ + . Thus, this means that 
each individual compares his/her own consumption with the average consumption in 
each period. We also assume that each individual treats the reference levels,  t c  and 
1 t c + , as exogenous. 
 
Since much of the subsequent analysis is focused on relative consumption concerns, it 
is useful to introduce measures of the degree to which such concerns matter for each 
individual. By defining 
ii
ttt cc Δ= −  and  11 1
ii
tt t x c + ++ Δ= − , we can rewrite the first part 
of equation (1) as 
111 (,, , , , , )
ii i i ii i
tt t t tt tt t Uv c z x G G +++ =Δ Δ . 
We can then define the degree of consumption positionality when young and old, 
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where  , /
ii i
tc t t vv c ≡∂ ∂  and similarly for the other variables. The term 
i
t α  can then be 
interpreted as the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last dollar spent in 
period t that is due to the increased relative consumption. For instance, if  0
i
t α = , then 
relative consumption does not matter at all on the margin, whereas in the other 
extreme case where  1
i
t α = , absolute consumption does not matter at all (i.e. all that   8
matters is relative consumption). The interpretation of
i
t β  is analogous except that 
i
t β  
reflects the degree of consumption positionality when being old instead of when being 
young. From the assumptions about the utility functions, we have 0,1
ii
tt αβ << . In 
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Thus,  t ρ  reflects the mean value of the degree of consumption positionality for all 
people alive in period t.  
 
Following earlier comparable literature, we assume that leisure is completely non-
positional, meaning that people only care about the absolute level of z. It is, 
nevertheless, possible to think of a situation where people also care about their 
relative leisure compared to others. In addition, although G is a pure public good in 
our study, one can easily think of publicly provided goods that have a spatial 
distribution that makes them less valuable for some people, and where people care 
about the relative possibility to use these goods. For example, people may derive 
utility not only from having access to a publicly provided recreation area, but also 
from having better access to such an area than others. Although these assumptions are 
crucial for most of the subsequent results, it is straightforward to adjust the model in 
order to take relative concerns with respect to z and G into account. The qualitative 
insights will still hold as long as private consumption is more positional than leisure 
and the public good. The (scarce) available empirical evidence is consistent with our 
approach. Carlsson et al. (2007) found that leisure is, in fact, much less positional than 
private consumption/income, and that it may even be completely non-positional. 
Solnick and Hemenway (2005) found that (spatially distributed) public goods too are 
considerably less positional than private consumption/income. 
 
Otherwise the utility function in equation (1) is quite general and may vary both 
between types and over time and is furthermore not necessarily time-separable, 
meaning for example that the marginal rate of substitution between relative and 
absolute consumption when being old is not necessarily independent of the 
consumption level when being young. Thus, the model is flexible enough to 
encompass habit formation in private consumption. Note also that the version of the   9
utility function in the second line is more general than in the first line. We start the 
analysis with the more general case that resembles a classical externality problem e.g. 
in terms of pollution associated with private consumption. Some more restrictive 
special cases of equation (1) will be discussed subsequently. 
 
The individual budget constraint is given by 
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t s  is savings,  1 t r+  is the market interest rate, while  () t T ⋅  and  1() t+ Φ ⋅  denote the 
payments of labor income and capital income taxes, respectively. The first order 
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tx t t uu x + = ∂∂, whereas 
'()
ii




tt t sr ++ Φ  are the marginal labor income tax rate and the marginal capital income tax 
rate, respectively. 
 
The production sector consists of identical competitive firms producing a 
homogenous good with constant returns to scale. Given these characteristics, the 
number of firms is not important and will be normalized to one for notational 
convenience. The production function is given by  ) , , (
2 1






t l n L =  is 
the total number of hours of work supplied by ability-type i in period t. The firm 
obeys the necessary conditions 
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where subindices attached to the production function denote partial derivatives. 
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meaning that the aggregate savings in period t will form the capital stock used in the 
production in period t+1. 
 
3. The government’s problem  
 
We assume that the government faces a general social welfare function as follows: 
     
 
11 2211 22
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which is increasing in each argument. Since the optimum conditions are expressed for 
any such SWF, they are thus necessary optimum conditions for a Pareto efficient 
allocation.
6 A similar formulation was used by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), although 
they in addition assumed that the social welfare function was utilitarian within each 
generation. 
 
The informational assumptions are conventional. The government is able to observe 
income, although ability is private information. As in most of the earlier literature on 
the self-selection approach to optimal taxation, we assume that the government wants 
to redistribute from the high income to the low income earners.
7 This means that the 
most interesting aspect of self-selection is to prevent the high-ability type from 
                                                 
6 All results obtained here that are independent of the social welfare function (i.e. basically all results 
that we comment upon) could have been obtained by instead explicitly solving for the Pareto efficient 
allocation by maximizing the utility of one ability-type born in a certain period, while holding the 
utility constant for all other agents (the other ability-type born in the same period and both ability-types 
born in all other periods). The chosen strategy is motivated by convenience, as it simplifies the 
presentation. 
7 This of course implies restrictions on the utility functions beyond what is stated above.   11
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where 
2 1 / t t t w w = φ  is the wage ratio (relative wage rate) in period t. The expression 
on the right-hand side of the weak inequality is the utility of the mimicker. Although 
the mimicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type in each period, 




Note that  ( ) t T ⋅  is a general labor income tax, which can be used to implement any 
desired combination of 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l  and 
2
t c  given the savings chosen by each ability-
type. Therefore, we will use 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l  and 
2
t c , instead of the parameters of the labor 
income tax function, as direct decision variables in the optimal tax and expenditure 
problem. Note also that the general capital income tax,  1() t+ Φ ⋅ , can be used to 
implement any desired combination of 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t c , 
2
1 t x +  and  1 t K + , given the labor 
income of each individual. Therefore, instead of choosing the parameters of the 
capital income tax function directly, we formulate the optimization problem such that 
1
1 t x + , 
2
1 t x +  and  1 t K +  are also used as direct decision variables. The resource constraint 
is given by 
 
  [ ] ∑
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8 The set of policy instruments facing the government in our framework means that it is able to control 
the present and future consumption as well as the hours of work of each ability-type (this is discussed 
more thoroughly below). As a consequence, in order to be a mimicker, the high-ability type must 
mimic the point chosen on each tax function (both the labor income tax and the capital income tax) by 
the low-ability type, and thus consume equally much in both periods.  
      12
Equation (15) means that output is used for private consumption, net investments and 
public consumption. 
 
The Lagrangean is written as 
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The first order conditions for 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t l , 
2
t c , 
2
1 t x + ,  1 t K +  and  t G  are given by
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9 Note that there is a potential time inconsistency problem involved here (since the government may 
have incentives to modify the second period taxation facing each generation) once the individuals have 
revealed their true types. Although we acknowledge this potential problem, we follow earlier 
comparable literature by only considering situations where the government commits to its tax and 
expenditure policies. This approach is motivated by the observation that lack of commitment from the 
point of view of the government opens a spectrum of possibilities for modeling both public policy and 
the response by the private sector, which would be beyond the scope of this paper. 
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in which we have used the first order conditions for the firm, i.e 
12 (,, ) i
i
tt t t L wF L L K =  
for i=1,2, and 
12 (,, ) tK t t t rF L L K = . 
 
3.1 The positionality effect 
 
Before turning to the optimal tax and expenditure expressions, let us first focus on 
equation (17), where  t £c ∂∂ will be referred to as the positionality effect, since it 
reflects the overall welfare effects of a change in the level of reference consumption, 
ceteris paribus. This effect can be rewritten in terms of the individual degrees of 
consumption positionality, implying the following: 
 
Lemma 1. The welfare effect of increased reference consumption in period t can be 
written as 
 
22 1 2 2 1
11 , 1 1 ,
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c1 1
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tt β β ≥  and 
12 ˆ tt α α ≥ , meaning that the low-ability type is at least as 
positional as the mimicker, so that  t £/ c 0 ∂ ∂<, then increased reference consumption 
in period t reduces the welfare. 
 
Proof: see the Appendix.   14
 
Two mechanisms are worth noticing. First, in the absence of the self-selection 
constraint, i.e. if ability-type specific lump-sum taxes were possible to implement, an 
increase in the reference consumption would unambiguously decrease the welfare, 
since the reference consumption enters the utility function of each individual via the 
arguments 
ii
ttt cc Δ= −  and  11 1
ii
tt t x c + ++ Δ= − . Thus, the reference consumption 
constitutes a negative externality for each type in each period. This explains the first 
term on the right-hand side of equation (26), which relates the positionality effect to 
the average degree of positionality without any reference to differences in the degree 
of positionality between ability-types. Second, if the low-ability type is more 
positional than the mimicker, then an increase in the reference consumption means a 
larger utility loss for the low-ability type than for the mimicker; as such, it contributes 
to an additional welfare loss via the self-selection constraint. However, if the 
mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type, then an increase in the 
reference consumption contributes to relax the self-selection constraint, implying that 
the second right-hand side term of equation (26) is positive; this mechanism will be 
discussed in more detail subsequently. In this case, the sign of  t £/ c ∂ ∂  can be either 
positive or negative. 
 
A consequence of the above discussion is that in the special case where the degree of 
















We will return to this special case in the analysis of optimal taxation and public 
expenditures. 
 
4. Tax and expenditure results 
 
In this section, we will present the optimality conditions for the marginal labor 
income tax rates, the marginal capital income tax rates and the public good provision 
in a format that facilitates straightforward economic interpretations and comparisons 
with the benchmark case with no relative consumption concerns. 
   15
4.1 Labor Income Taxation 
 
Define the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption for 













and similarly for the mimicker. The marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability 
type is derived by combining equations (8), (18) and (19), while the marginal labor 
income tax rate for the high-ability type is derived by combining equations (8), (21) 
and (22). We show in the Appendix that 
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, ˆ / tt t c t u λ λγ = . The first part of each tax formula is analogous to results derived 
in earlier literature and is due to the self-selection constraint. With 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
zc zc MRS MRS >  
(which applies if the preferences do not differ between ability-types), and if we 
assume (by analogy to earlier comparable literature) that 
1 /0 tt l φ ∂ ∂<, the contribution 
of the self-selection constraint is to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the 
low-ability type. Similarly, if 
2 /0 tt l φ ∂∂ > , the self-selection constraint contributes to 
decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type. These effects are 
well understood from earlier research; see Stiglitz (1982). 
 
On the other hand, the final part of each formula is novel, and is due to the relative 
consumption concerns. As indicated above, although an increase in the reference 
consumption reduces the utility of each ability-type, the derivative  t £/ c ∂∂ can be 
either positive or negative. This is so because it affects the self-selection constraint 
and, therefore, also the utility of the mimicker. The following result is a consequence 
of combining Lemma 1 with equations (27) and (28):   16
 
Proposition 1. If the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker, so that 
t £/ c 0 ∂∂<, then the positionality effect contributes to increase the marginal labor 
income tax rate facing each ability-type, ceteris paribus. 
 
Note that although Proposition 1 gives a sufficient condition for the final part of both 
equation (27) and (28) to be positive, it is not necessary, since  t £/ c ∂ ∂  can be negative 
even if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type. 
 
To go further, we make use of the positionality effect definition described above. This 
enables us to address more thoroughly how the concern for positionality affects the 
marginal labor income tax rates. Let us use the short notations 
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where 
1
t σ  and 
2
t σ  reflect the optimal marginal labor income tax rates without relative 
consumption concerns, i.e. the first term on the right-hand side of equation (27) and 
(28), respectively. The term  t Γ  reflects positionality differences between the 
mimicker and the low-ability type, where  0 t Γ >  ( 0 < ) if the mimicker is always (i.e. 
as both young and old) more (less) positional than the low-ability type. By combining 
equations (26), (27) and (28), we can then rewrite the formulas for the marginal labor 
income tax rates such that the contribution of positionality is decomposed into two 
effects as follows: 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type can 
be written in the following additive form (for i=1,2): 
 
 
'( ) [1 ] [1 ][1 ]
1
ii i i i t
tt t t t t t t
t
Tw l σσ ρσ ρ
Γ
=+ − − − −
−Γ
.   (29)   17
  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
To interpret Proposition 2, let us start with the simplest first-best case where there is 
no cost of fulfilling the self-selection constraint, i.e.  0 t λ =  for all t. Then,   
12 0 ttt σσ == Γ = , implying that 
'1 1 '2 2 () ( ) tt t tt t t Tw l Tw l ρ = = . In this (unrealistic) case, 
there is no value of further redistribution of income from the high-ability to the low-
ability type, and the marginal labor income tax rates reflect a pure efficiency effect. 
This exemplifies a straightforward Pigouvian tax, where people are taxed for their 
consumption causing negative (positional) externalities on others, whereas leisure 
does not. One additional dollar for all in the economy, ceteris paribus, implies that the 
average utility increase is only 1 t ρ −  of the sum of each individual’s utility increase 




Consider now the more general and realistic second-best formula in Proposition 2. 
The intuition is again straightforward. The first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (29) is the tax expression that would follow without any positional concern. 
The second term reflects the marginal external cost of consumption, which is now 
modified compared with the first-best. Consider first the low-ability type. The choice 
of additional work corresponding to a one dollar gross wage increase causes negative 
external costs as in the first-best case. However, these external costs are now smaller 
than in first-best, provided that 
1 0 t σ > . Indeed, the part of the income increase that is 
paid in taxes will not imply any positional externalities. By analogy, if 
2 0 t σ < , the 
term 
2 [1 ] 1 t σ −>  means that the government attaches greater weight to the corrective 
part of the tax formula for the high-ability type than in the first-best. The intuition is 
that the self-selection component in the formula for the high-ability type is a subsidy, 
which strengthens the positional externality. 
 
                                                 
10 This case resembles the identical consumption tax derived by Dupor and Liu (2003) in a first-best 
economy.   18
Before discussing the final part of equation (29) in more detail, let us briefly consider 
the special case where  0 t Γ= , which is of relevance for comparison with earlier 
literature on optimal income taxation. In this case, equation (29) reduces to 
 
'() ( 1 )
ii i i
tt t t tt Tw l σ σρ =+ − .       (30) 
  
Equation (30) is particularly striking from the perspective of the marginal labor 
income tax rate of the high-ability type. A common assumption in earlier literature on 
general income taxation is that the wage rates are fixed. In this case, 
2 0 t σ =  and 
equation (30) simplifies to 
'2 2 () tt t t Tw l ρ = , as externality correction would be the only 
motive for taxing the high-ability type at the margin. 
 
Returning once again to Proposition 2, the third term on the right-hand side of 
equation (29) reflects self-selection effects of positional concerns. Suppose first that 
0 t Γ> , in which case the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type. This 
means that a given decrease in private consumption (due to higher taxation) causes a 
larger utility loss for the low-ability type than for the mimicker. Therefore, mimicking 
becomes more attractive and the relevant self-selection constraint tightens. This 
provides an incentive for the government to implement a lower marginal labor income 
tax rate than it would otherwise have done, which means that the third term 
contributes to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate. On the other hand, if 
0 t Γ< , then the opposite argument applies, as a higher marginal labor income tax rate 
in this case tends to relax the self-selection constraint. Consider also the two factors 
that are proportional to  t Γ . The factor [1 ]
i
t σ −  is interpretable in a way similar to its 
effect on the second term of equation (29): if [1 ]
i
t σ −  of an additional dollar is already 
taxed away, it does not give rise to positional externalities. Similarly, the factor 
[1 ] t ρ −  appears because the induced self-selection effects are due to the non-
positional part of the marginal income.  
 
In summary, the mechanism behind the third term can explain why it is theoretically 
possible that relative income concerns work to reduce the marginal labor income tax   19
rate. If  0 t Γ> , and if increased marginal income taxation creates a sufficiently strong 
incentive to become a mimicker, then this effect may dominate the externality-
correcting component. 
 
Consider now the order of magnitudes. Since concerns for relative consumption are 
difficult to measure, it is not surprising that the available estimates of ρ  vary 
considerably in the literature, although almost all estimates are substantially above 
zero. For example, according to Alpizar et al. (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007), ρ  is 
typically in the order of magnitude of 0.5, whereas Luttmer (2005) obtained larger 
estimates close to one. There is little evidence regarding the size of Γ; perhaps a 
value of zero is a reasonable first approximation. Overall, the results then suggest that, 
given the framework, the optimal marginal labor income tax rates may be 
substantially higher when taking relative consumption effects into account. 
 
4.2 Capital Income Taxation 
 
Let us then turn to the marginal capital income tax structure. Define the marginal rate 













and similarly for the mimicker. The marginal capital income tax rate for the low-
ability type can be derived by combining equations (9), (19), (20) and (24), whereas 
the marginal capital income tax rate for the high-ability type can be derived by 
combining equations (9), (22), (23) and (24). We show in the Appendix that the 
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Let us start by discussing the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. 
Note that the first row is due to the appearance of the self-selection constraints. The 
first term reflects the self-selection constraint in period t. It means that if the relative 
valuation of current consumption by the low-ability type exceeds (falls short of) the 
relative valuation by the mimicker, there is an incentive for the government to 
stimulate (discourage) current consumption via a higher (lower) marginal capital 
income tax rate. As such, this incentive effect serves to relax the self-selection 
constraint by making mimicking less attractive. There is a similar purpose behind the 
second term in the first row, although this effect is associated with the self-selection 
constraint in period t+1. It arises here because the savings in period t determines the 
capital stock in period t+1. If an increase in the capital stock increases (decreases) the 
wage ratio, then mimicking becomes less (more) attractive, providing an incentive for 
the government to stimulate (discourage) savings by choosing a lower (higher) 
marginal capital income tax rate than it would otherwise have done. Note also that the 
first row of the formula for the high-ability type is analogous to, and has the same 
interpretation as, the second term in the first row of the formula for the low-ability 
type. These effects are well understood from earlier research. 
 
The second row of each tax formula is novel and refers to the assumption that the 
private consumption good is, in part, a positional good. As the marginal capital 
income tax rates reflect a desired tradeoff between present and future consumption, 
each such term is decomposable into two parts. The intuition is, of course, that each 
individual values relative consumption both when young and old. By combining 
Lemma 1 with equations (31) and (32), we can derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. If the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker in all 
periods, then the positionality effect in period t,  t £/ c 0 ∂ ∂<, contributes to decrease 
the marginal capital income tax rates in period t+1, whereas the positionality effect in   21
period t+1,  t+1 £/ c 0 ∂∂ <, contributes to increase the marginal capital income tax 
rates in period t+1, ceteris paribus. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. The positionality effect in 
period t means that an increase in the average consumption in period t gives rise to a 
welfare loss. This provides an incentive for the government to choose lower marginal 
capital income tax rates than it would otherwise have done, which in turn stimulates 
savings and discourages consumption in period t. By analogy, the positionality effect 
in period t+1 means that an increase in the average consumption in period t+1 results 
in a welfare loss. As a consequence, there is an incentive for the government to reduce 
the average consumption in period t+1, which means that the government chooses 
higher marginal capital income tax rates than it would otherwise have done. The 
relative size of these two effects determines whether the appearance of positional 
goods constitutes an incentive to tax or subsidize the capital income, ceteris paribus. 
 
So far, we have not used the decomposition of the positionality effect given by 
equation (26). In general, since two such effects are involved, this decomposition does 
not give results that are as easy to interpret as the corresponding expressions for the 
marginal labor income tax rates in Proposition 2. Nevertheless, it is instructive to 
combine equation (26) with equations (31) and (32) in the special case where the 
degree of positionality does not vary over time. Consider Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4.  If the average degree of positionality as well as the positionality 
differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type remain constant over time, 
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.       (34) 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.   22
 
Two aspects of Proposition 4 are worth emphasizing. First, there is no direct effect of 
positionality in the tax formulas and, second, there is no need to modify the effects of 
the self-selection constraint that are common in the two tax formulas (the relationship 
between each marginal capital income tax rate of the aggregate capital stock). 
Therefore, in this special case, the appearance of positionality does not change the 
way in which we measure the marginal capital income tax rate of the high-ability type 
(compared with an economy without positional goods). The intuition is that under the 
conditions in the proposition, the current and future aspects of positionality cancel out 
to a large extent, suggesting that the incentives underlying capital formation are 
similar to those that would apply in economies without positional goods. However, 
this does of course not mean that the effect of positionality that still remains is 
necessarily unimportant. 
 
Note that leisure is not generally weakly separable from private consumption. As a 
consequence, the low-ability type and the mimicker will differ with respect to the 
relative value attached to current consumption: the contribution of this difference to 
the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type is still affected by concern 
for positionality. To interpret the “positionality-weight” [1 ]/[1 ] ρ − −Γ , consider first 
the situation where 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS > , meaning that the first term on the right hand 
side of equation (33) contributes to increase the marginal capital income tax rate of 
the low-ability type. As such, this term works to increase the current (first period) 
consumption of the low-ability type and, as a consequence, also the reference 
consumption in period t. The expression 1 ρ −  serves to modify this effect, as 
increased reference consumption gives rise to positional externalities. In other words, 
if we (for the moment) were to abstract from differences in the degree of positionality 
between the mimicker and the low-ability type, implying that  0 Γ = , the positionality-
weight works to decrease the marginal capital income tax rate. This effect is 
counteracted (further strengthened) by  0 Γ >  ( 0 < ), as increased references 
consumption, in this case, relaxes (tightens) the self-selection constraint in period t. 
The interpretation is analogous if 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS < . 
   23
It is worth emphasizing once again that there is no direct effect of positionality in 
equations (33) and (34) that is independent of the self-selection constraint. The 
following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 4:
11 
 
Corollary 1.  Suppose that the average degree of positionality as well as the 
positionality differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type remain 
constant over time.  Then, if leisure is weakly separable from private consumption in 
the sense that  11 1 11 ((, , , ,, ) ,,, , , )
ii i i i
tt t t tt t t t t t tt t Uq f c x G G c cz c c G G ++ + ++ =  describes the 
utility function, and the wage ratio is constant so that  11 /0 tt K φ ++ ∂ ∂= , then both 
marginal capital income tax rates are zero. 
 
Note that the function  () f ⋅  is the same for both ability-types, while the function  ()
i
t q ⋅  
may still vary across ability-types. Although the above result is based on assumptions 
that may not seem entirely realistic, it is, nevertheless, interesting from the perspective 
of comparison with earlier literature. Corollary 1 implies that the important result 
derived by Ordover and Phelps (1979), for when capital taxation is not needed, carries 
over to our more general case that includes relative consumption concerns.   
 
4.3 Public good provision 
 
Define the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption for 



























and similarly for the mimicker. Using these definitions and substituting the social 
optimum conditions for private consumption, i.e. equations (19), (20), (22) and (23), 
into equation (25), we show in the Appendix that 
 
                                                 
11 From the separability assumption follows that
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS = .   24
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where 
11 ,22 , 1 1 ,2 2 ,
,, , 1 , 1 ,
tt t t
t G t G ct G ct G xt G x MB n MRS n MRS n MRS n MRS −− =++ +  is the sum of each 
individual’s (alive in period t) marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for the public good 
in period t expressed in terms of his/her private consumption in this period. Note that 
this marginal WTP is defined while holding the consumption of everybody else fixed, 
which will be discussed further below. The first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (35) reflects the marginal rate of transformation between public and private 
goods, which is by assumption normalized to unity, and the second and third terms 
reflect self-selection effects that are well understood from earlier research. The fourth 
term is novel. We have: 
 
Proposition 5. If the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker, so that 
t £/ c 0 ∂∂<, then the positionality effect contributes to increase the optimal provision 
of the public good.  
 
The intuition is straightforward. When private consumption causes negative 
(positional) externalities and public consumption does not, it is optimal to provide 
relatively more of the public good.
12 
 
In order to express the optimality condition in terms of individual degrees of 
positionality, note that  t [£ /c ] / [ ] [ ] / [ 1 ] tt t t t N γ ρρ ∂∂ = Γ − − . Using the short notation  
22 , 1 , 2 2 , 1 , 1
,, , 1 ,, , ˆˆ ˆˆ
tt tt tt
tc Gc Gc t x Gx Gx
tt
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12 Note that Proposition 5 should of course not be interpreted to mean that the amount provided in an 
economy where people care about relative income should necessarily be larger than in an economy 
where they do not. Rather, the appropriate interpretation is that given that people do care about relative 
consumption, the provision of the public good should be extended beyond the level that corresponds to 
the optimality rule without considering the positionality effect.   25
for the self-selection terms that would result without any positional concerns, we 
obtain: 
 













.       (36) 
 




Corollary 2. If the mimickers’ degree of positionality is the same as the one of the 
low-ability type, as both young and old, and if leisure is weakly separable from 
private and public consumption when young and when old, so that the utility function 
can be written as  11 1 1 1 ( ( , , ,) , (, , ,) , , ,)
ii i i i
t t t ttt t t tt ttt Uq f c G c cg x G c cz c c ++ + + + = , then the 
optimal provision of G is given by  , 1 tG t MB ρ = − .    
  
Note that the functions  () f ⋅  and  () g ⋅  are the same for both types, while the function 
()
i
t q ⋅  can still vary. Although the assumptions underlying Corollary 2 are strong, they 
will, nevertheless, provide a natural benchmark case. The interpretation is 
straightforward. Given suitable separability assumptions and assumptions about the 
positionality distribution, we cannot relax the self-selection constraint via provision of 
public goods. Now, remember that ρ  is the average degree of positionality, meaning 
that, on average, ρ  is the fraction of the utility increase from a one dollar increase in 
private consumption that comes from increased relative consumption. If each person 
                                                 
13 If the mimickers’ degree of positionality is the same as that of the low-ability type, as both young 
and old, then clearly  0 t Γ= . From the separability assumption follows that 2, 1,
,, ˆ tt
Gc Gc MRS MRS =  and 
2, 1,
,, ˆ tt
Gx Gx MRS MRS = . Note also that the separability structure is general enough to allow the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of private consumption to depend on leisure. For example, it 
may seem plausible that consumption when being young (compared to when being old) becomes 
relatively more valuable when leisure increases. A utility function such as the one in Corollary 1 would 
not allow this.     26
receives one additional dollar, then the relative consumption is held constant, and 
what remains is the absolute, or the non-positional, utility effect. Assume, for 
example, that  0.8 ρ =  and that everybody pays one additional dollar for increased 
provision of the public good. Then the utility decrease of this payment is only 20% 
(i.e. 1-0.8) as large as it would have been had we aggregated the utility losses of each 
dollar payment in isolation. For the public good there is by definition no such leakage. 
 
Consider now the interpretation of equation (36) more generally. In the absence of 
positional effects, the term 1 t +Ω  would equal the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution on the left-hand side, where  t Ω  reflects effects on the self-selection 
constraint of a marginal substitution of private consumption for public consumption. 
Since a tighter self-selection constraint implies a social welfare loss, it implies a social 
cost if it becomes more attractive for the high-ability type to mimic the low-ability 
type. Consider now the effect of  t Γ . An additional public good provision clearly 
implies a reduction in private consumption. If the mimicker is more positional than 
the low-ability type, then  0 t Γ> . The reduction in private consumption for all implies 
a relatively larger utility loss for the less positional. Thus, in this case, it becomes 
relatively more attractive to become a mimicker, in turn implying that the relevant 
self-selection constraint tightens and a corresponding marginal social cost.  
 
Let us now return to the issue of the interpretation of the benefit side, i.e. of  , tG MB . 
How to measure the benefit of a public good is a classic problem in economics at least 
since Samuelson (1954). There are different practical methods that we will not dig 
deeper into here. However, we briefly discuss the implications of different ways to 
measure the benefit given that the method works as intended. In principle, i.e. given 
that people respond truthfully according to their preferences, , tG MB  reflects the sum of 
all people’s marginal WTP for G, ceteris paribus, i.e. while holding everything else 
fixed. However, an increase in G typically comes together with other changes, notably 
that other people’s taxes or charges are increased. In one frequently used method, the 
survey-based so-called contingent valuation (CV) method, it is typically 
recommended (see Arrow et al. 1993) that a realistic payment vehicle is used when 
asking people about their maximum WTP. One often used payment vehicle is to ask   27
the subjects how they would vote in a referendum where everybody would have to 
pay a certain amount, the same for all, through increased taxes (or charges) for the 
improvement. In the standard case where people do not care about relative 
consumption, this formulation has no important theoretical implication given that 
people respond truthfully (although it may of course make the exercise more realistic). 
Here, however, it does. Consider the case where others will have to pay the same 
amount as an individual i for the increment. This implies that i’s relative consumption 
will be unaffected, so 
i
tt cc −  and  11
i
tt x c + + −  are constant. This, in turn, implies that the 
































Gc CVMRS  can be interpreted as ability type i’s marginal WTP for G in terms 
of c, provided that everybody else alive at this moment in time will have to pay the 
same amount at the margin. We then have a corresponding aggregated benefit 
measure as 
11 , 22 , 1 1 , 2 2 ,
,, , 1 , 1 ,
tt t t
t G t G ct G ct G xt G x CVMB n CVMRS n CVMRS n CVMRS n CVMRS −− =++ + . 













,     (37) 
 
where  t Ψ  reflects the normalized covariance between the degree of non-positionality 
of private consumption and the marginal WTP as reflected by a contingent valuation 
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,   28
where a bar denotes mean value, and  t α  and  ,
t
Gc CVMRS , irrespective of type and age, 
denote the degree of positionality and marginal WTP for the public good conditional 
on the payments of others, respectively. We can then derive:
14 
 
Proposition 7. If (i) the mimickers’ degree of positionality is the same as that of the 
low-ability type, as both young and old, (ii) leisure is weakly separable from private 
and public consumption, when young and when old, so that the utility function can be 
written as  11 1 1 1 ( ( , , ,) , (, , ,) , , ,)
ii i i i
t t t ttt t t tt ttt Uq f c G c cg x G c cz c c ++ + + + = , and (iii) the 
individual maximum WTP for the public good is elicited with a payment vehicle where 
all individuals have to pay the same amount, then the optimal provision of the public 
good is given by  , 1 tG CVMB = . 
 
Therefore, given that all individuals have to pay the same amount at the margin, the 
marginal benefit measured as the sum of marginal WTP should equal the marginal 
production cost. In other words, we are back to the basic cost-benefit rule where 
marginal benefit in terms of people’s aggregate marginal WTP equals marginal cost. 
Alternatively speaking, the basic Samuelson (1954) rule holds; the aggregate marginal 
rate of substitution between the public good and the private consumption is equal to 
the corresponding marginal rate of transformation when the relative consumption is 
                                                 
14 The self-selection effects have the same interpretation in equation (36) as in equation (37). The factor 
t Ψ appears to have no important economic interpretation. It reflects the fact that the condition stated in 
the WTP question is in general impossible to realize in practice. To see this, consider a situation where 
the sum of people’s conditional aggregate WTP equals the relative production price (=1). Now, assume 
that there are equally many low- and high-ability types, and that high-ability individuals have a higher 
conditional WTP than low-ability individuals (12 instead of 10 USD). Also, let the good be financed at 
the margin so that the high-ability individuals pay 12 USD and the low-ability type 10 USD. However, 
since the average conditional marginal WTP is 11 USD, the average actual payment for the good by 
others is also 11 USD. This means that the relative income of the high-ability individuals has 
decreased, and that low-ability individuals have obtained an equally large relative income increase.  
The net welfare effect is then given by the positive relative income effect times the positionality of the 
low-ability individuals minus the negative relative income effect times the positionality degree of the 
high-ability individuals. Thus, the net welfare effect is positive if those with a lower marginal WTP are 
more positional than those with a higher marginal WTP.  In other words, the net welfare effect is 
positive if  0 t Ψ> .   29
held constant. The intuition is again straightforward. If others too have to pay, there is 
no “leakage” of the change in private consumption through relative consumption 
effects, implying that there are no reasons to correct for positional effects. However, 
what is perhaps less clear is whether people really manage to see through all effects 
while responding to WTP questions in practice. Still, before taking possible cognitive 
limitations or other deviations from rationality into account, it is important to know 




This paper has analyzed the importance of relative consumption concerns for optimal 
nonlinear labor income and capital income taxation as well as for public good 
provision in an OLG framework. The results are possible to express in terms of 
straightforward modifications of the standard optimality results. Under reasonable 
assumptions, relative consumption concerns work in the direction of increasing the 
marginal labor income tax rates. Moreover, linking the results to available empirical 
evidence on the degree to which people care about relative consumption suggests that 
the marginal labor income tax rates may be substantially higher when such concerns 
are taken into account. The results on capital income taxation are less clear-cut, and 
relative consumption concerns can affect the marginal capital income tax rates in 
either direction, at least within the current framework. An important result derived by 
Ordover and Phelps (1979) for when capital taxation is not needed is also shown to 
carry over to our more general case.  
 
The importance of relative consumption concerns for public good provision depends, 
in principle, on how people’s marginal WTP for a public good increase is elicited. If 
people are asked about their WTP independently of others, then relative consumption 
concerns may imply that substantially more of the public good should be provided 
compared to the choice rule without such concerns. However, if people’s maximum 
WTPs are elicited conditional on a payment vehicle where others have to pay too, e.g. 
through a tax increase, then there is little effect of relative consumption concerns on 
the appropriate choice rule for public good provision. Whether people in reality 
manage to see through all interdependent effects is of course less clear, and is an issue 
for future research also more generally.    30
 
Although our framework is more general than earlier comparable literature, several 
strong assumptions remain. First, we assume (as do other comparable studies) that 
individuals only work during the first period of life. This is an assumption of 
importance for the structure of the marginal labor income tax rates. Second, our study 
is based on a closed economy, which means that we disregard the possibility that 
cross-country interactions affect the measure of reference consumption used at the 
individual level. A relaxation of the latter assumption is particularly interesting, as it 
opens up for the study of public policy and relative consumption in a multi-country 
setting, where people also to some extent compare their consumption with the 
consumption of people in other countries. This means that the economy is 
characterized by transboundary positional externalities, suggesting that the optimal 
tax and expenditure policies derived in the context of a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium may differ substantially from those corresponding to a (second-best) 
cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, relative consumption concerns may also be an 
argument for international policy coordination. We leave these and other possible 




Proof of Lemma 1 
From equation (1) we have that  ,,, t
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Corresponding expressions hold for the mimicker. By combining equations (17), (A1) 
and (A2), and the corresponding expressions for the mimicker, we obtain 
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Substituting equations (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7) into equation (A3) gives equation 
(26). 
 
The Marginal Labor Income Tax Rates 
 
Consider the tax formula for the low-ability type. By combining equations (18) and 
(19), we obtain 
 
1 1
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.   (A8) 
 
By substituting 
11 1 1 1 1
,, '( ) / tt t t tz t c Tw lw w u u =−  into equation (A8) and rearranging we 
obtain equation (27). The marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type, 
equation (28), can be derived in a similar way. 
 
To derive equation (29), we combine equations (26) and (27) to obtain 
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Then, by using 
1, 1 1 1
, /1 ' ( )
t
zc t t t MRS w T w l =−  and rearranging, we obtain equation (29) for 
the low-ability type. That equation (29) also holds for the high-ability type can be 
verified by instead combining equations (26) and (28) and arranging in a similar way 
as for the low-ability type. 
 
The Marginal Capital Income Tax Rates 
 
Let us consider the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. By 
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.               (A10) 
 
Then use equations (9) and (24) to derive 
1, 1
,1 1 1 1' ( )
t
cx t t t t MRS r r s r + ++ =+ − Φ  and 
21
111 1 , 1 11 (1 ) [ / ] tt t t t z t t t ru l K γγ λ φ +++ + + ++ =+ + ∂ ∂ , respectively. Substituting into equation 
(A10) and rearranging, we obtain equation (31). Equation (32) can be derived in a 
similar way. 
 
To derive equations (33) and (34), let us substitute  t [£ /c ] / [ ] [ ] / [ 1 ] tt t t t N γ ρρ ∂ ∂= Γ − −  
as well as the corresponding expression for period t+1 into equations (31) and (32). 
We shall also use the short notations 
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to represent the self-selection terms in equations (31) and (32). The marginal capital 
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for i=1,2. Now, using 
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11 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 ˆ (1 ) / [ / ] [ / ] tt t t t t x t tt ru l K γγ λ γ φ ++ + + + + + + +− = − ∂∂  into equation 
(A12) and using the definition of 
i
t δ , we obtain equations (33) and (34).  
 
Public Good Provision 
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.                      (A13) 
 
By substituting equations (A4)-(A7) into equation (A13), we obtain 
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Using again the MRS definitions and the definition of  , tG MB , we obtain equation (35). 
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
ii t i i t






−+ − = + Ω
+Γ ∑ .              (A17) 
 
The left-hand side of equation (A17) can be rewritten by using a covariance 
expression: 
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Substituting equation (A18) into equation (A17) gives equation (37). 
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